This essay examines the "revolutionary liberal" outlook expounded by the young Italian journalist and intellectual, Piero Gobetti, immediately following the First World War. It considers the historical evolution of his "agonistic" liberalism according to which conflict rather than consensus serves as the basis of social and political renewal. The essay traces the formation of Gobetti's thought from his idealist response to the crisis of the liberal state, through to his endorsement of the communist revolutionaries in Turin and his denunciation of fascism as the continuation of Italy's failed tradition of compromise. Whilst Gobetti's views presently resonate with a growing interest in the agonistic dimension of politics, it is argued that his elitism and his understanding of liberalism as a "civic religion" reveal challenging tensions in his thought.
4 generated deep resentments; when combined with the military injuries and loss of life, disappointment at the meager territorial gains and economic recession, the calls for renewal began to proliferate. 7 Gobetti's journalism began in 1918 when, at the age of seventeen, he and some friends set up their own review, Energie Nove ("New Energies"). An exceptionally gifted and intellectually mature child, Gobetti had joined the University of Turin in the same year that
Europe's Great War ended. Turin's university was known for the strong sense of intellectual leadership and civic responsibility of its members, particularly the Faculty of Law into which Gobetti entered. 8 Energie Nove followed a similar vein of post-war publications calling for radical cultural renewal and asserting the need to reconnect political and ethical life in a new, morally inspiring outlook. For many Italians, the war's end signaled the exhaustion of parliamentary politics. Long despised for its elitism, corruption and failure to win the support of the vast majority of the country, liberal politics now seemed utterly anachronistic. Despite government concessions such as electoral reform, the dopoguerra (post-war period) was characterized by a pervasive atmosphere of anti-parliamentarism and an intense expectation of change. 9 Intellectuals and other public figures from across the political spectrum clamored to define and lead this expectation, dismissing party politics as ineffectual and calling for a deeper, "spiritual" transformation of public life that would invest it with greater inclusivity and vitality.
The dominant strain in this ferment of intellectual radicalism was idealism and like many other thinkers of his generation Gobetti's early work owed much to its leading proponent, Benedetto Croce, a figure of singular influence in Turin. 10 At the turn of the century Croce had inspired a generation of intellectuals to renounce positivism and conceive society and history as the product of creative subjectivity. In his "immanentist" philosophy, which opposed itself to all transcendental, metaphysical claims, human progress stemmed not from abstract knowledge of objective laws but from an affirmation of the role of "spirit" in practically confronting and shaping the world. Only through a serious and committed grounding of ourselves and our lives in the historical problems we confront individually, he argued, could we find meaning and value in our existence. 11 This austere "facing-up" to the world we inherit and make by ourselves without any metaphysical guarantee, Croce thought, could itself serve as Italy's long-desired secular faith. Though not a professional academic, Croce's lesson nevertheless inspired the aesthetic radicalism of journals such as Giovanni Papini's La Voce and Giuseppe Prezzolini's Leonardo which, rather to the Neapolitan's concern, had extended his historicism and subjectivism into a wholesale revolt against rationalism. 12 Gobetti identified Energie Nove explicitly with Croce, Papini and Prezzolini. 13 In a key article of May 1919, "La Nostra Fede," he presented the project of the review precisely in terms of the formation of a new faith. Denouncing the parliamentary parties for their "vast and imprecise formulae," for representing egoistic and not common interests, successful only in ensuring the "triumph of personal interests with the complete absence of ideals," Gobetti diagnosed the "misadventures of Italian public life" in "the absence of sincerity and clarity," a condition expressed perfectly in giolittismo (the parliamentary maneuverings of Giovanni Giolitti, Italy's frequent, yet much maligned, liberal prime minister).
14 Political values, he claimed, were out of step with the needs of everyday life. The remedy to this unhappy condition, he declared, was "a healthy rethinking of ideas." 15 Rejecting party doctrine in favor of a new spiritual disposition was not, however, an easy option. For it required not merely the renunciation of the parties' "mental schemes" but "an entire moral upheaval." 16 At the basis of this idealist revision of thought and action was a distinctly Crocean message, the absolute immanence and dynamic, self-creating force of human spirit. 17 For Gobetti, idealism set itself against all "revealed truths," especially those of the parties, and substitutes for them "the truth that is conquered day by day with the work of each." 18 That meant arousing a "profound passion" that challenged apathy and indifference:
"Honesty consists in having ideas, and believing them and making them the center and purpose of oneself. Apathy is the negation of humanity, abasement of oneself, absence of 6 ideality." 19 Absorbing this rather pious message, for Gobetti, was not simply a matter of private personal salvation. It was, he insisted, the only way politics could be done.
Gobetti's liberal orientation pushed him at this time towards a radical political reformism. Like many young intellectuals, he was attracted to the battles of the independent socialist and long-standing critic of the liberal regime, Gaetano Salvemini. 20 Although aimed at a range of literary and cultural topics, Energie Nove helped publicize Salvemini's campaigns against the parliamentary "transformism" and political neglect of the "Southern Problem" and his journal devoted issues to shared concerns such as school reform 21 and the international situation.
Naturally, like Salvemini, it was deeply critical of the liberal political elite. 22 However, by the end of the 1919 the political situation in Italy had begun to shift significantly.
In September the poet Gabriele D'Annunzio led an expedition of a thousand troops to "seize" the north-eastern border town of Fiume, so giving form to a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with territorial gains after the war and heightening the sense of an unresolved national crisis. 23 In November, general elections were held on a new system of proportional representation. The results saw a large increase in votes and parliamentary deputies for the Socialist Party, as well as the new, Catholic, Popular Party (results later confirmed in the local elections in Autumn 1920). 24 Increasingly, Italian middle classes became fearful of an evident shift to the left. The socialists gains, argued Gobetti, portended Italy's ruin. 25 Throughout December 1919, Gobetti seemed prepared to continue his editorship of Energie
Nove and had even sketched out several plans for its development into a larger and more thematically comprehensive journal. 26 However, in February 1920 he interrupted these plans, calling for an intermezzo in the review's publication which, in fact, was never recommenced. 27 Gobetti declared his desire to rethink his activities; elsewhere vowing to continue supporting Salvemini and other cultural activities in Turin. 28 But in a private letter he suggested he had undergone an "intimate crisis." 29 The reformist politics he had been pursuing, he later admitted, seemed overly fragmented and lacking in intellectual vision. 30 Over the course of the next two years, Gobetti's intellectual and political focus shifted 7 dramatically as Italy's crisis deepened and revolutionary upsurges spread throughout the industrial North and amongst the provincial, rural towns of the center. Events forced Gobetti to refocus his militant idealism onto the renewal of liberalism as a radical, emancipatory outlook responsive to concrete social and political struggles. Thus for Spriano, 1920 represents "the great turning point for Gobetti," seeing both his absorption into the factory council debates in Turin and, eventually, the arrival of his new publication, La Rivoluzione
Liberale.
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LIBERAL REVOLUTION
Gobetti followed other young radicals in his immense esteem for the Here we are in the full flow of revolution. I am following with sympathy the efforts of the workers who really are constructing a new order. I don't feel the urge to follow them in their work, at least just now. But, little by little, it seems to me that the greatest battle of the century is being clarified and imposed. Then my place will be with those who have most religiosity and spirit of sacrifice. Today the revolution is posed in all its religious character. Certainly, the hour is difficult even for the workers.
By now, at least in Turin, they have liquidated the organizers and the old abstractionist and corrupt leaders, and they are doing things themselves. 39 Although he remained at some distance from the factory struggles themselves, the experience convinced him that the workers' revolutionary struggle was the central thrust in bringing about, from below, the revitalization of culture and politics to which he aspired.
Despite the occupations' ultimate failure to initiate the revolutionary upsurge for which 9 L'Ordine Nuovo had hoped (the workers eventually returned to the factories after the unions organized a compromise), Gobetti's political loyalties had been dramatically changed. The future, he was convinced, lay with the workers and their assertion of autonomy from the illiberal, protectionist state. 40 In In the central article of that first issue, "Manifesto," Gobetti laid out the historical perspective orienting the project. Italy's current political dilemmas consisted, fundamentally, in its inability to constitute itself as a "unitary organism"; this itself derived from the incapacity of its citizens to form an "awareness of the state." For Gobetti, the lack of a ruling class, of a modern economy, and hence the experience of exercising liberty, further contributed to these failings.
Deprived of liberty, we were deprived of an open political struggle. The first principle of political education was absent, namely the choice between ruling classes. While the vitality of the state, presupposing-in whatever form-the adhesion of citizens, is based precisely on the ability of each to act freely and to realize this way the necessary work of participation, control, opposition.
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Whilst various intellectual and political efforts in the nineteenth century had been made to develop a sense of liberty as the basis of political community, the Italian state was eventually formed not through the projection of a common culture but through shifting alliances between sectoral interests that eventually "corroded" the relation between government and people:
the post-Risorgimento state emerged as "a government without validity and without autonomy because abstracted from the real conditions and founded on compromise; a people educated in materialism, without conscience and will, in a perennially anarchic attitude before any social organization." 43 In the post-war environment, however, old liberalism was "dead," killed by Giolitti, Catholicism and parliamentary democratic socialism, none of whom managed to answer the question of how to make a national political community. Nevertheless, Gobetti saw in the unfolding political crisis and popular struggles a timely resurgence of the aspiration to exercise liberty. It was the self-appointed task of his review "to adhere to all the experiences of autonomy by proposing to clarify, help, and renew … this movement of popular redemption." 44 Privileged amongst these demands for autonomy was the workers' movement which "has been in these years the first lay movement in Italy, the only one capable of bringing to its logic the modern, revolutionary value of the state, and of expressing its antiCatholic, religious ideality, denying all Churches." 45 Gobetti's sympathies for the Turin communists were, however, subordinate to a wider vision of liberalism as an ethic of liberation grounded in the spontaneous movement of history. 46 Here he drew upon the liberalism of Luigi Einaudi, economist and commentator whose classes Gobetti attended at university. For Einaudi-a free-market liberal deeply opposed to state protectionism-the open clash of class interests was the spur to social progress. Left to its own devices-that is, watched from afar by a non-interfering and minimal state-civil society ought to be left free to produce its own compromises. Gobetti shared neither Einaudi's individualism nor his rigid anti-statism, 47 but he fully endorsed the idea of an intrasocietal struggle for group autonomy as the premise of a liberal ethic. 48 Not unlike Gramsci's socialism, Gobetti's reading of liberalism was filtered through the work of Georges Sorel, in particular his idea of "myth" as a form of collective consciousness derived spontaneously from the experience of struggle. The workers' movement, Gobetti argued in a letter of August 1920, was "the only valid force in political life, because it is the only one that can act, in a sorellian way, as myth." 49 Where Gramsci identified myth with socialism, however, Gobetti saw it as essentially liberal. Thus his praise for the Turinese proletariat's recognition of the "revolutionary value of the state" continued to understand the term "state" not as a concrete apparatus of power (as, in this instance, it was for Gramsci) but as an organized collective consciousness. It was precisely this galvanizing, disciplining force of a revolutionary consciousness á la Sorel that attracted Gobetti, not its immediate aims as such. If socialism was the "starting point" for this myth, "the point of arrival is always liberalism, history; the painful contingency of problems and solutions that are never in a preconceived system because they are born from the practical conciliation of that system and all the others according to which men think." 50 Gobetti's association with Gramsci and L'Ordine Nuovo led some to consider him of the same ideological camp, an accusation he angrily rebuked: "I am diametrically opposed to
Gramsci. My ideas are the fruit of a mature and in-depth examination of the failure of the Italian revolution of the 1800s." 51 This comment disguises Gobetti's admiration for Gramsci, displayed clearly elsewhere, 52 but it points to his comprehensive philosophical rejection of reformist socialism, communism and Marxism as political doctrines. 53 Only in so far as these converged on liberalism's emancipatory principles were they of interest to him. Gobetti conceived the workers' movement as an agent for liberalism's revolutionary values, not an ideal model of economy and politics.
Gobetti's view that liberalism referred essentially to the struggle for liberty rather than to the exercise of specific liberties provided a theoretical platform intended to enable liberals to identify with radical programmes which were not themselves explicitly liberal. In this view, the concept of liberty was understood in a "political" sense, that is, it was associated with demands for collective autonomy and not exclusively with a "negative" concept of individual liberty, to use Isaiah Berlin's categories, in which liberty involves an individual's ability to act without hindrance. Equally, however, Gobetti was not supplanting the negative concept with a "positive" or "thick" view of human ends as such, bar the implicit view that liberty, sharpened through conflict, would serve to realize human potential. His instincts remained broadly with the classical defense of individual liberty. As Meaglia argues, on both economic and cultural questions Gobetti typically defended the free initiatives of individuals to act without the paternalistic interference of the state or any other agency. 54 In this sense he remained an "economic" liberal.
But Gobetti was aware that the political environment within which negative liberties were to be defended was, certainly in Italy, still incomplete. It was to this, fundamentally political, objective that his revolutionary liberalism was primarily directed. In some respects, Gobetti's views resemble the work of recent proponents of classical republicanism like Quentin
Skinner for whom negative and positive conceptions of liberty need not be opposed. Rather, negative or individual liberty is conceived as being inseparable from a shared political liberty, that is, the freedom of the community as whole from unwarranted or arbitrary interference in its collective decision-making. 55 Although not elaborated analytically this way, Gobetti's agonistic liberalism suggested a similar overlapping of individual and political liberty, but focused particularly on the political side in which struggles for collective autonomy emerged.
This political liberalism, promoted as a cultural, "religious" or "ethical" outlook, enabled
Gobetti to speak across ideological divisions and identify with evidently non-liberal movements such as council communism.
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Getting people to think, to undergo a political education adequate to the historical circumstances, then, was the practical thrust of Gobetti's revolutionary liberalism and the goal to which his new review was directed. As he put it himself: "Our task today is not to elaborate a program of government … but to elaborate a program of action within the state, to create a unity and not to presuppose it." 57 Political education, of course, needed its teachers and Gobetti's program was openly directed at forging a new "aristocracy," an elite to channel demands for autonomy into a coherent worldview. Here, Gobetti reflected the widespread influence of the Italian political scientist and theorist of the "ruling class,"
Gaetano Mosca, who then also taught at the university. Mosca's claim that political life was characterized by a struggle between elites over the offices of power was adapted by Gobetti to underscore the clash of ideals amongst social forces as they define themselves against prevailing forms of power: "The world is made by small minorities: these can and must be educated-rationally." 58 New social groups and classes produce new elites who struggle for domination and develop new myths to sustain them. Gobetti's view of elites lacked Mosca's conservatism and cynicism towards popular movements in that it viewed the clash of social forces as a positive source for the renewal of liberty and understood elites as more or less genuine representatives-rather than detached manipulators-of the groups from which they emerged. 59 When talking of the Turin factory council movement, Gobetti typically underlined his interest not in the mass of workers but in the "heroic minority" of its leaders developing the vision of a new social and political order. Interested neither in their socialism nor collectivism, the workers struggles were significant to him because their praxis "deny all formulae" and their experiences "will end by bringing us a new ruling class." 60 The crucial aspect of the struggles was, evidently, less the participation of ordinary workers than the moral guidance offered by its leaders. 61 After the defeat of the factory council movement in September 1920 and the subsequent formation of the Communist Party in 1921 (which absorbed, and effectively neutralized, Gramsci and the ordinovisti), Gobetti realized that the formation of a new elite would be some time in coming. Whilst resolutely convinced the workers would be at the head of any revolutionary movement, his attention shifted back to the legacy of the Risorgimento and the currents of radical thought within Italian political culture past and present. 62 Rivoluzione
Liberale was directed precisely towards those liberal intellectuals and educated middle classes desirous of change but who, thought Gobetti, would not ally with the workers for fear of abandoning liberal principles. Revolutionary liberalism was itself a method of analysis designed to expose the connection between those principles and the social conflicts then underway. 63 The real test of liberal values, he was proposing, was not in the comfortable distance of abstract ideals but in the gritty terrain of historical reality. by the fascists' populist nationalism, initially sought out "something good" in its parliamentary coalition. 65 Gobetti, however, grasped very early on its fundamentally anti-liberal orientation and as early as May 1922 he dedicated Rivoluzione Liberale to interpreting the phenomenon and warning other liberals of the threat it posed. 66 Gobetti's initial response to fascism was politically dismissive yet theoretically incisive. He shared a common revulsion amongst educated liberals at the crude, rhetorical posturing of Mussolini and his movement's violent, anti-socialist tactics. The fascists, he claimed, were a contradictory and unstable collection of bellicose urban petty-bourgeoisie and agrarian reactionaries, "palingenetics" trading on the myth of revolution but whose internal disagreements and class divisions couldn't be hidden. 67 As for Mussolini, he was an opportunist and a dogmatist, an anachronistic condottiere leading a band of savages. He lacked the creativity and the religious character of a proper leader. 68 In addition to these comments, however, Gobetti developed a more sophisticated view.
Fascism represented more than a temporary and distasteful disruption of political life; it symbolized Italy's historical failings as a nation-state. 69 For all its revolutionary rhetoric, fascism implied a continuation of the traditional practices in Italy of substituting open conflict with consensus, compromise and collaboration between political leaders; thus, "Fascism is the legitimate heir of Italian democracy." 70 In "Elogio della Ghigliottina," written just after
Mussolini's so-called "seizure" of power, Gobetti memorably defined fascism as the "autobiography of a nation": in it was condensed all of Italy's cultural and political failings, principally an immaturity of Italians and their party political representatives preventing them from facing up to the liberating force of social and political conflict. 71 The "disaster" of fascism lay in its violent and illiberal denial of heresy, but this was a disaster with deep roots in Italy, No and no again") Gobetti suggested it was necessary to let fascism run its course: "We remain historians over and above the day-to-day … and we work for another revolution." 73 Not for the first time was Gobetti's program open to the accusation of being an ineffectual, cultural rather than directly political action.
However, Gobetti's political instincts were sharpened in June 1924 following the murder of the reformist socialist deputy, Giacamo Matteotti, by fascist heavies in Rome. Matteotti had openly denounced the elections of April that year which were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation and which were organized under a new electoral system designed to reward the largest party with a disproportionately large number of seats. Not surprisingly, the fascists made significant gains and Matteotti's defiance deliberately threatened publicly to discredit Mussolini. 74 Matteotti's brutal murder, evidently undertaken with the support of the prime minister, generated widespread revulsion among the parliamentary opposition many of whom marched out of the Chamber of Deputies in protest. 75 The "Aventine secession," as it was called, seemed for a moment to unify the various opposition parties and threatened to withdraw any constitutional recognition for Mussolini who still relied on the support of conservative elites. Gobetti now saw the potential for an intransigent anti-fascist politics led by mass parties; 76 he narrowed down his disdain to the older constitutional parties alone, 77 talked up the idea of a modern, European democratic parliament, 78 and recruited "Liberal Revolution Groups" to promote an inclusive coalition. 79 However, the Aventine's aspirations, such as they were, and particularly those articulated by its leader, the liberal deputy Giovanni Amendola, were strictly legalistic in that they aimed to invoke an intervention by the Monarch to remove Mussolini. 80 By consequence, and in part because of remaining animosities between the parties, the Aventine failed to act sufficiently quickly or effectively to dislodge Mussolini. 81 Outside of parliament, they were unable able to mobilize the doubters who remained in the Chamber and Senate and the prime minister survived the immediate storm.
In January 1925, Mussolini dramatically announced his intention to install an authoritarian order. 82 Measures were taken immediately to curtail freedom of assembly and association, particularly against suspected "subversives" and by October the regime began to suppress opposition parties and arrest their leaders. 83 Gobetti succeeded that year in publishing a book version of La Rivoluzione Liberale collecting his various articles from the journal in a narrative historical study of political struggles in contemporary Italy. 84 However, the review itself produced its last number in November after the authorities ordered Gobetti to cease all editorial and publishing activities. Already unwell with heart problems after an assault by fascists, he decided to move to Paris in the new year. There he intended to resume his antifascist politics with other radical liberal sympathizers. However, to the shock of his companions back in Turin, he never recovered from his ill-health and towards midnight of 15
February 1926 he died of heart failure. clash of forces but in so doing it prevented any renewal of liberty. 88 In common with fascism, he claimed, Italian liberals had developed a "fear of po It is just this liberal "fear of politics" that around the same time inspired the German legal philosopher and conservative, Carl Schmitt, to formulate his own agonistic outlook. 90 A very brief comparison with Gobetti is illuminating. For Schmitt, too, liberal parliamentarism had denigrated politics in its tendency to foreground compromise and procedure. 91 In The
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LIBERTY AND STRUGGLE
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Concept of the Political he also tried to reassert the "ever-present possibility of conflict" by specifying the distinction between "Friend" and "Enemy" as the essential criterion of "the political." 92 Yet, Schmitt's line of argument led him to reject liberalism altogether and, eventually, support Nazism. The conflictual basis of politics was, for him, indicative of the need for the state as a sovereign entity to act as supreme arbiter. 93 Moreover, his concept of the political was indifferent to the content of the conflict that invoked it. 94 Gobetti, by contrast, focused on politics outside the state and formal politics, adopting the kind of "pluralistic" outlook that Schmitt expressly disliked. Conflict was specified precisely in terms of struggles for liberty, not political enmity in general. Unlike Schmitt, then, for whom domestic politics had to be suppressed if politics was to be affirmed, Gobetti adopted a more democratic agonism in which the state appeared as a potential obstacle to further conflict and not its supreme expression. Thus Schmitt's agonist outlook underscored his later commitment to fascism; whilst Gobetti's propelled him forcefully, and fatally, against it.
Gobetti's message later resounded powerfully in Italy both as a symbol of anti-fascist defiance and, more recently, as a moral critique of the postwar democratic republic. 95 However, significant tensions remain in Gobetti's thought that his devotees often overlook.
Not surprisingly, what is regarded as his great innovation-an ethical liberalism based on the principle of conflict-is also the source of some unresolved difficulties. If liberty has an agonistic basis, then the question arises as to how liberalism can have durability and establish itself as a shared ethic, regulating conflict within its own terms rather than succumbing to endless disputation and violence.
Gobetti's answer, such as it was, was to invoke the role of elites in clarifying liberal values and leading the wider populace into a new civil philosophy, a recurrent theme in Italian political thought. 96 As we have seen, this was the explicit purpose of his review, La
Rivoluzione Liberale, and a similar objective is detectable in his other publications which focus on the principal role of historical thinkers in advancing liberty as the basis of a new civic religion. 97 Gobetti invested a great deal in the capacity of emergent elites to grasp the spontaneous movement of freedom and give it "religious" expression in the manner of Sorel's idea of "myth." 98 But the content of any ideological doctrine was not of primary significance, for its liberal value inhered in its liberatory function, not its explicit goals. New social elites would mobilize the masses towards an expression of freedom, their liberal character deriving from their quest for autonomy and not explicitly from the demands they articulated. Yet the specific goals of any social movement-for instance, the Turinese communists' demands for a self-regulating society of producers-would almost certainly be opposed to change for its own sake, instead preferring to establish a social order on the basis of values and forms of organization considered, if not utterly permanent, at very least appropriate to the specific historical conjuncture. Gobetti provided little justification, then, for thinking that social movements would or should themselves take up liberal values and build institutions that support and sustain these values.
Gobetti believed elites would arise spontaneously amongst social forces, more or less adequately "representing" them through the propagation of myths. 99 However, his own comments suggest a certain disdain for the wider public and a suspicion that they remain largely incapable of an intelligent understanding of political life: "The masses are only capable of working in short enthusiastic bursts and do not follow a constant directive …Today they admire and love you: tomorrow they will want to kill you because you remind them of their inferiority." 100 Thus Gobetti's call for "popular redemption" can be read as a moral critique of Italians' capacity for self-enslavement. From this perspective, the "democratic" character of elites resides in their ability to represent the "better" side of Italians and not in any specific mechanism of accountability; this implies an asymmetrical political 20 division oriented to producing an enlightened ruling class who can clarify the antagonistic terrain from which they originally emerge. 101 points to a tension in his liberalism between the creative and ever-renewing sense of libertyas-struggle and the need to contain that struggle within parameters that ensure its beneficial (i.e. pro-liberal) results. This is inevitable once liberty is based on the indeterminacy of historical struggles rather than a transcendental epistemology. For it remains a matter of contingent judgement as to how any specific conflict contributes to or detracts from a liberal "religiosity." Agonistic liberalism reminds us that liberty is grounded in conflicts but, by definition, it can tell us neither how to resolve those conflicts nor how to draw from them some sense of "collective renewal." Such things have to be worked out pragmatically. For liberals this situation implies an uncommon burden of political responsibility, a duty both to allow conflicts to occur and to cultivate them into a sense of public "faith". It is no surprise, perhaps, that many liberals have opted instead for the authoritarian response.
The problem of this burden is implied by David Roberts who argues Gobetti's understanding of the role of liberal intellectuals like himself was profoundly ambivalent. On the one hand he identified a role for critically-aware liberal thinkers to advise and nurture new social elites;
whilst, on the other, he implied a more modest role of developing a historical understanding of events without actively participating in them. For the most part, claims Roberts, Gobetti 21 looked to political struggles rather than to isolated intellectuals to foster a religion of liberty.
But in practice, he continues, Gobetti "remained a typical middle-class intellectual divorced from the masses" and his review exuded a "snobbish tone … seeking to improve Italian political culture." 106 This "left edge of liberalism," as Roberts calls it, was consequently extremely fragile, attracting young middle-class intellectuals towards new radical movements but not securing these intellectuals in a distinctively liberal program.
Gobetti's liberalism answered the desire to expand liberal values across a divided nation by presenting them as immanent to an unfolding, conflictual reality. In so doing, he followed other Italian intellectuals in extolling the virtues of a civic religion of liberty, a common cultural framework to redeem the nation and inscribe its politics within robust moral ideals. However, like many other liberals he remained uncertain of the role the wider populace might play in this culture and, consequently, ascribed a primary role to elites in imposing intellectual order on the antagonisms of the masses. The tensions in his thought to which this gives risebetween masses and elites, social struggles and intellectual coherence, specific demands for autonomy and broader liberal ideals-can be understood to stem from this peculiar agonistic construction of a liberal civil religion. They affirm Emilio Gentile's point that the rather distant, high-brow approach to civil religion produced by liberal intellectuals prior to fascism kept them apart from the wider populace and singularly failed to grip the nation in the way they had hoped.
107
CONCLUSION
No liberal these days would express sympathies with fascist dictators. But it is less certain, in the face of so-called "security threats" and "clashes" of civilizational cultures, that liberals are genuinely open to the discomforts of deep conflict over the meaning and practice of liberty. In what are often treated as "exceptional" cases, it is all too easy to run to the bunker, let the state do its work and reappear après la lutte clutching the "rules of the game". Gobetti's brief intellectual and political career remind us that the political game-be it an elite-driven democracy or something more "deliberative"-is open to critique, contest and, sometimes radical, revision. Unless liberals integrate the concept of liberty into a constitutive dimension of politics, they are at risk of enclosing themselves within a legalistic culture that prioritises consensus over conflict, losing touch altogether with the intellectual and material vibrancy of social polemic. But Gobetti's example also indicates how difficult this lesson is to learn.
Inspiring a renewed faith in liberty requires an enormous, perhaps unrealistic, commitment to politics, and an improbable reliance on the virtues of elites to satisfactorily mediate conflict in a way that enriches our understanding of liberty rather than neutralises it. 
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